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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890464-CA

v.
Category No. 2

ALAN CRAIG ABBOTT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of burglary, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-2(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Has defendant properly preserved and raised on

appeal the issue of the admissibility of defendant's prior bad
acts?
2.

Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion in

ruling, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b) that prior bad acts of
defendant were admissible in the state's case in chief for proof
of intent as an element of the crime of burglary?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable statutes and rules of evidence for a
determination of this case are:
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202:
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of a
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling
in which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah Rules of Evidence 404:
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of
a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut the evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of
the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimesf wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.

Utah Rules of Evidence 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence 609:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from his
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless oE the
punishment,
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction
under this rule is not admissible if a period
of more than ten years has elapsed since the
date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, admissible of a
conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless
the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent
to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the
use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulmentf or
certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule
it (1) the conviction has been the subject of
a pardon, annulment, certificate of
rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of
the person convicted, and that person had not
been convicted of a subsequent crime which
was punishable by death or imprisonment in

excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of
juvenile adjudications is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may,
however, in a criminal case allow evidence of
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other
than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility
of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of
an appeal therefrom does not render evidence
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of
the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Alan Craig Abbott, was charged by
information with burglary of a non-dwelLing, a third degree
felony (R. 7). A jury trial was held on May 10th and 11th, 1989,
the Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge, Second Judicial District
Court, presiding (R. 63-5).

The jury returned a verdict of

guilty as charged (R. 62). Defendant waived time for sentencing
and was sentenced on May 11, 1989, to the Utah State Prison for
the statutory indeterminate term of five years to life (R. 67).
The sentence is to run concurrently with defendant's prior
commitment for a parole violation (R. 67; T. 26-28).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 23, 1989, Dr. Leroy Taylor, a physician,
was working late at his office at 425 Medical Drive, Bountiful,

Utah (T. 11, 18). There are twenty to thirty offices in the twostory building and four entry-exit doors into the building (T.
35-36).

Dr. Taylor's office is on the second floor (T. 36). On

the main floor, the entry-exit doors are on the west, south and
east sides of the building with the main entrance being on the
west side (T. 13, 36). On the second floor, there is an entryexit sliding door which leads directly to the second level of the
parking lot (T. 36). Normally, the building is opened at 7:00
a.m. by the janitor and locked at 7:00 p.m. by the night cleaners
(T. 15-16, 97). However, each tenant has a key to the building
and may enter at off-hours (T. 80-81).
Dr. Taylor had been home the night of February 23rd but
returned to the building around 1:30 a.m. (T. 18-19).

When he

arrived, the only lights on in the building were those in the
lobby-pharmacy area near the main entrance, in the common
hallways and in the office directly below Dr. Taylor's (T. 27,
39).

Dr. Christian has the office below Dr. Taylor's and

normally leaves a light on in the office every night whether he
is there or not (T. 38-9).

Only one other vehicle was in the

parking lot; it belonged to another doctor who was not in the
building at the time (T. 39, 53). No other tenants were in the
building (T. 18, 55). Dr. Taylor entered the building through
the east doors on the second floor, using his key to unlock and
then re-lock the door (T. 19). He then entered his own office,
using a different key (T. 16, 19). Dr. Taylor remained working
in his office for approximately thirty minutes (T. 20).

Dr. Taylor exited his office at approximately 2:00 a.m.
(T. 20). As he turned in the hallway, he immediately saw
defendant standing in the hall with his back towards the east
entry-exit doors (T. 20). Defendant was just starting to move
west away from the outside doors.

Defendant and Dr. Taylor were

within three to five feet of each other (T. 20). Dr. Taylor did
not know defendant and asked if he could help him (T. 21).
Defendant responded that he was looking for the bathroom (T. 21).
Dr. Taylor asked defendant if he had a key to get into the
building; defendant responded "yes" and held up some keys (T. 2223).

By this point, defendant was moving away from Dr. Taylor,

down the stairs leading to the first floor and the main entrance
(T.

23). Defendant was approximately twelve to fifteen feet

away from the doctor who could not see anything specific about
the keys, other than it was a ring of keys (T. 23, 25-6).

Dr.

Taylor continued to question defendant as defendant walked
rapidly away (T. 25). Dr. Taylor asked defendant to identify
himself; defendant responded with a made-up name, claiming he was
associated with an intern (T. 24-5, 185). Dr. Taylor asked:
"In this building?" And [defendant] said
'yes, three to four years' and I said 'not in
this building. There is no o:ie here by that
name.' And I said 'I need some
identification.' And I said 'I need some
identification." (sic) And he looked up and
said, "Who are you?' and I said, 'Dr.
Taylor.' I told him I needed some
identification. We have some dollars in this
building and we need some ID or I will call
the police.

(T. 25). Defendant continued down to the first floor and did not
respond (T. 25). Dr. Taylor began to call the police but then
decided to follow defendant instead.

He went to his car and

drove around the building, trying to find defendant.

He did not

see anyone (T. 26).
Dr. Taylor then returned to his office and called the
police (T. 28). Approximately five to ten minutes had elapsed
from the initial encounter (T. 30). The police arrived within
three to five minutes, and checked the outside perimeter of the
building (T. 30, 46-7).

The police found all four entry-exit

doors to be locked; however, the main entrance door on the first
floor could be unlocked from the inside by turning the handle (T.
49, 51). There were no signs of forced entry into the building
(T. 56). The police proceeded to check the interior office
doors, all were locked except for one on the second floor.

That

door was ajar, but nothing was disturbed in the office (T. 49).
The open office was directly west of Dr. Taylor's on the opposite
side of the hallway (T. 54-55).
Neither the police nor Dr. Taylor saw anyone leaving or
near the building (T. 31, 55).
Based on

Dr. Taylor's description and subsequent

identification, the police interviewed defendant the next day.
Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and
voluntarily waived them (T. 61). The police informed defendant
that they were investigating a burglary in which defendant had
been identified as the suspect (T. 62). Initially, defendant
denied being at the medical building, but when told that Dr.

Taylor had identified him, defendant responded that nothing had
been taken (T. 62). Defendant then told the police that he was
working for First Continental Communications Company (FCCI), a
private telephone company and had gone to the building to install
a telephone (T. 63, 72, 116-18).

He claimed that he had made

arrangements with someone in the building but could not recall
the name of the person he had contacted (T. 63). Defendant told
the police that he was looking for a location near the exits of
the building (T. 63). Defendant stated that he had entered the
building through the main entrance, which he claimed was unlocked
(T. 64). When the police asked defendant why he had entered the
building at such a late hour, defendant responded that:
[H]e had gone to an auction in Salt lake.
That after the auction was coicluded that he
got a bite to eat, that he then came back out
toward his home and stopped off in Bountiful
at the Medical Center for this reason to look
for another location for a phone in this
particular building.
(T. 65). But, when the police drove defendant to Salt Lake City
so that he could show them the location of the auction, defendant
could not identify the building or locate its whereabouts (T.
77) .
Further, the manager of the medical building testified
that he never discussed the installatioi of a telephone with
either defendant or FCCI and did not authorize defendant to be in
the building at anytime (T. 85, 87-8).

The defendant was never

authorized to have a key to the building (T. 30). Another tenant
of the building, Greg Skedros, who had been authorized by the
manager to arrange for the installation of new telephones in the

building (T. 86-7), also testified that he had never had any
contact with defendant or his company nor had ever authorized
defendant to be in the building (T. 91-5).
Three other witnesses, including the night cleaners who
had checked the outside doors of the medical building on February
23rd, all testified that all four exit-entry doors were locked
the night in question (T. 96, 102, 105).
Ann Glasgow, the operations manager of FCCI, testified
that defendant did work as an independent contractor for the
private telephone company.

Defendant was responsible for finding

new telephone locations and would receive one hundred dollars
($100.00) per approved telephone contract (T. 118). Defendant
began working for the company in September, 1988 (T. 118). He
earned in commissions $900.00 in September, nothing in October
and November, $1900.00 in December of 1988 and nothing in January
or February of 1990 (T. 119). Two hundred dollars ($200.00) of
the December monies were paid in February (T. 126-7).

None of

the telephone contracts involved installations of telephones in
medical facilities, most were shopping mall locations (T. 122).
Defendant telephoned Ann Glasgow shortly after he was
arrested (T. 122). He told her that he was in the Davis County
Jail.

He said he had been doing a location survey at the medical

building and was approached by the police for being on the
premises (T. 122). He claimed that the police stopped him at the
front entrance to the medical building but that he was not in the
building itself as the doors were locked (T. 122, 124-25).

After the admission of the above evidence, during the
State's case-in-chief, the State moved for the admission to
defendant's prior burglary convictions, as well as admission of
dismissed burglary charges admitted to by defendant (T. 128).
The State contended that such evidence should be admitted
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b) to show intent, lack of mistake
and accident (T. 146-7).

Defendant objected on Utah R. Evid. 609

grounds, claiming that the evidence was otherwise "immaterial"
(T. 146, 147-8).

An evidentiary hearing was held (T. 129-146).

The court applied that balancing test of Utah R. Evid. 403 and
determined that the evidence's probative value was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (T. 149-50).
The court ruled that the evidence was admissible under Rule
404(b) but reserved its ruling on Rule 509 grounds until it was
determined if defendant would take the stand (T. 148-151).

The

court stated that the jury would be specifically instructed as to
the purpose of the evidence (T. 151).
Based on the court's ruling, Detective Jim Glover, Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office, testified that he interviewed
defendant on May 6, 1985.

As a result, defendant plead guilty

The is no dispute that defendant's 1985 statements to the
police were voluntarily and knowingly made. Nor, is there any
dispute as to the accurateness of their factual contents (T. 129146). Additionally, the parties agreed that defendant went to
prison on July 12, 1985 and was released to a half-way house on
parole on October 6, 1987 (T. 153-54).

to three burglaries and acknowledged involvement in others (T.
2
156-57).
Defendant told Detective Glover that:
At 225 South on 2d East, the Hotel
Development, a building was entered through a
rear-door and a box of keys was found on a
desk, on the third floor. Using those keys
he went through every office except No. 230,
in the Hotel Development Corp. He took a
$100 bill and $20 bill.
. . .

He went into the Greystone complex using keys
that he had obtained from another burglary
and went through three offices. He got about
$30.
(T. 157). On cross-examination, defendant's attorney expanded by
eliciting that defendant had cooperated fully with the police in
clearing up thirty burglaries (T. 159, 161). Additionally, his
attorney brought forth that at least one of the burglaries, one
he plead to, involved the taking of $1750.00 in cash, while
another, not testified to in the direct examination, involved the
theft of $1000.00 (T. 159-60).
The court immediately instructed the jury as to the
restricted purpose for the admission of the prior bad acts (T.
161-62); and, the State rested (T. 162).
Defendant's wife testified on defendant's behalf as to
their poor financial condition in 1985, when defendant had
admittedly been involved in numerous burglaries, and their
improved financial condition in February, 1989 (T. 164-66).

She

admitted that at the time of this charge, defendant had not been
The jury was not informed-by the State that defendant admitted
involvement in thirty burglaries. That evidence was presented to
the trial judge in determining the admissibilty of the evidence.
The court instructed the State that they would be limited to
introducing the three convictions plus three dismissed charges
(T. 132-142, 151).

working, even though still associated with the private telephone
company (T. 167). Another defense witness, David Beacco, stated
that he had been with defendant in December and early January on
several occasions when defendant was attempting to locate new
telephone locations (T. 169-70).

Defendant told Beacco that he

was considering a medical building in Bountiful, which he was
"trying to get to it, but hadn't" (T. 170). However, Beacco
never went with defendant into the medical building on any
occasion; nor, ever entered any business with defendant except
when the business was open in the daytijxie or early evening hours
(T. 171-72).
Defendant took the stand.

During his direct

examination, his attorney further questioned defendant about the
circumstances surrounding his prior burglaries (T. 190).
Defendant volunteered that he was still on parole at the time of
this incident (T. 187, 205) and in response to a direct question
of his attorney, told the jury that he had been committed to the
Utah State Prison for the prior burglaries, serving 27 months in
prison and 8 months in the halfway house (T. 187, 191). The
prosecutor did not refer to the defendant's prior record in his
cross-examination of defendant and did not question him
concerning his financial situation other than in 1989 (T. 193210).
Defendant claimed that during the early evening hours
of February 23, he had been in Salt Lake City conducting
business.

He stated that he went to an auction clearing house

but no one was there.

(T. 174-77).

Sometime after midnight, he

stopped at the Lake View Hospital, across the street from Dr.
Taylor's medical building, to conduct a telephone survey (T. 17879).

After half-an-hour to an hour, defendant went to the

medical building.

He had been there one time previously on

February 14, 1989 to survey the telephones (T. 180). He parked
near the main entrance (T. 182-83).
illuminated.

The front door area was

He did not know what other lights, if any, were on

in the building (T. 183). He walked to the front door, pulled on
it and it opened.

He walked in (T. 183). He observed

immediately that a new telephone had been installed from the last
time he was in the building (T. 183-84).

He was "curious" to see

if a second telephone had been installed on the second floor (T.
184).

When he got to the top of the stairs, he saw Dr. Taylor.

Defendant did not dispute the gist of Dr. Taylor's description of
the ensuing conversation.

(T. 184). He admitted he had lied

about his identity to the doctor and left quickly when confronted
by Dr. Taylor because he knew he should not be in the building
(T. 185-87).

He denied telling the doctor that he had a key to

the building but admitted that he held up his hand with the keys
in response to the doctor's question of how he had gotten into
the building (T. 185-86, 196-97).

He admitted that he did not

tell the doctor that he worked for a telephone company or was
looking for a place to install a telephone (T. 197). Defendant
stated he just wanted to end the conversation quickly (T. 198).
Defendant further admitted that he never told Mrs.
Glasgow that he was in the building (T. 208). He verified that
he had not worked from December 28, 1987 to February 2, 1988 (T.

203).

He maintained that the only other time that he had been in

the medical building was February 14, and specifically denied
that he had been there on February 18 (T. 206-8).
In rebuttal, the State called the fourteen year old son
of the nighttime cleaners of the medical building (T. 214). He
stated that on February 18, after the building was locked, he was
cleaning a second floor office when he heard keys and turned
around to see defendant enter the office (T. 216-18, 219).
Defendant did not say anything, but tuned around upon seeing the
cleaners and walked out (T. 218).
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of
third degree burglary (R. 63).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
During the evidentiary hearing below on the State's
motion to admit the prior bad acts of defendant in its case in
chief, defendant only objected to the admission of such evidence
on Utah R. Evid. 609 grounds, stating the evidence was otherwise
"immaterial".

However, both the State, in making the motion, and

the court, in ruling, considered the admission of the evidence
under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) and 403, for purposes of proof of
intent, lack of mistake or accident.

As such, defendant failed

to make proper objection to the admission of the evidence during
the State's case in chief, as opposed to its use for impeachment
or credibility purposes.
Further, on appeal, defendant has not objected to the
admission of the evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds, the basis under
which the court admitted it. As at trial, defendant is relying

exclusively on Rule 609 grounds, grounds inapplicable to its
admission in the State's case in chief.

Defendant has therefore

waived on appeal any objection to the admission of the evidence
under Rule 404(b),
Should this Court consider the substantive issue, the
trial court applied the proper test in weighing the admission of
the evidence under Rule 403. Unless this Court views the trial
court as clearly abusing its discretion, deference should be
given to the trial court's ruling on the evidentiary matter.

If

this Court views the admission as error, any prejudicial effect
was enhanced and compounded by defendant in eliciting greater
detail concerning the prior bad acts then allowed by the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A PROPER
CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS IN THE
STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF; AND, HAS FAILED TO
PROPERLY RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL SUCH THAT
DEFENDANT SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED ANY
OBJECTION.
The Utah appellate courts have consistently required a
party objecting to the admission of evidence to make a timely and
specific objection for the question of the admissibility of the
evidence to be considered on appeal.

State v. McCardell, 652

P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982); State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah
1983).

As stated most recently:
As a general rule, a timely and specific
objection must be made in order to preserve
an issue for appeal. . . . Absent a timely
objection, [the appellate court] will review
an alleged error only if it is obvious and
harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain
error'.

State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989)-

Accord,

State v. Gotschall, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, 52-53 (1989); State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied 110 S.Ct. 62
(1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); Utah R.
Evid. 103(a).
Here, pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(b), the State moved
in its case in chief for the admission of evidence of prior bad
acts of defendant to prove intent, lack of mistake or accident
(T. 128, 146-7).

The State proceeded, out of the presence of the

jury, to put on evidence specifically setting forth the prior bad
acts which consisted of prior burglary convictions as well as
dismissed burglaries to which defendant admitted his involvement
(T. 129- 146). Defendant objected by stating:
MR. HATCH: I don't have any further
questions. I object to the three offered
exhibits [certified copies of defendant's
convictions] on the basis that they are
admissable should I include the past records
as admissible. Should I choose to put him on
the stand and I think the State limits the
basis, you can ask him how - ly felonies he's
been acquitted of, if he says yes they can
ask him what. It goes to credibility only
and these other admissions have been
dismissed that are in jeopardy now are
entitled immaterial.
(T. 146). The State responded that while they would like to
"preserve the option of impeachment in the event that the
defendant does take the stand," the basis of the current motion
to admit was premised on Utah R. Evid. 404 to show intent (T.
146-7).

Defendant responded that any prior history was limited

to impeachment (T. 147-8).

The Utah Supreme Court has previously viewed a general
objection as insufficient.
Ct. App. 1989).

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah

Equally, the Court has held that an objection to

evidence on grounds other than that on which it was admitted does
not preserve review of the issue on appeal.

State v. Eldredge,

773 P.2d 29, 35; State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947.
In defendant's case, the basis of the admission was
clearly under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) and 403 (T. 149-151).

Indeed,

since the evidence was admitted in the State's case in chief, the
evidence could have only been admitted "at this portion in the
trial" (T. 151), as noted by the trial court, for proof of some
elemental aspect such as intent.

The trial court's cautionary

instruction given to the jury when the evidence was presented
makes clear the basis of the admission (T. 161-62).
Credibility and impeachment under Rule 609 were future
issues to be determined in the defense case if the defendant
testified.

For this reason, the trial court, while expressing an

initial opinion on the admissibility of the prior convictions for
credibility, recognized that a balancing test would still finally
determine their admissibility even if defendant testified (T.
148-90).

For that reason, the court reserved making a final

ruling on Rule 609 grounds depending on whether or not defendant
chose to testify (T. 151). When defendant did testify, no
further objection was made to the evidence.

Nor, did the State

attempt to cross-examine defendant concerning his prior record
(T. 173-208).

Instead, defendant, both by volunteering the

information and through questioning of his attorney, presented
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additional details of the prior bad acts (T. 164-66; 187, 190-91,
205) .
Further, on appeal, defendant has not raised any issue
as to the admissibility of the evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds
but has limited his brief to a discussion of Rule 609.

Since the

court only admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b), defendant
should be deemed to have waived any objection.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON EVIDENTIARY
MATTERS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS IT IS SHOWN
THAT THE COURT CLEARLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.
A trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters must be
upheld unless it is "manifest that the trial court so abused its
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted,"
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1937).

Accord, State

v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Banner,
717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986).

An evidentiary ruling as to the

admission of evidence, under Utah R. Evid. 403, will likewise
only be reversed for abuse of discretion where the admission of
the evidence constituted harmful error.

State v. Dibello, 780

P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989); State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 419
(Utah 1989).

But, erroneous admission of evidence will be deemed

harmless where there is "convincing, properly admitted evidence
of all essential elements of the case," State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d
646, 656 (Utah 1989).
As properly noted by the trial court in this case, the
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, such that evidence
of prior acts is admissible if relevant to prove an element of

the crime; unless under Utah R. Evid. 403, the evidence's
probative value is "substantially outweighed" by its prejudicial
effect (T. 148). State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah 1989);
Boyce, Utah Rules of Evidence, 85 Utah L. Rev. 63, 84 (1985).
But, the State recognizes, that within the general rule, the Utah
appellate courts have scrutinized Rule 404 admissions for their
potential prejudicial effect. State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 45657 (Utah 1989) and cases cited therein; State v. Featherson, 118
Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1989), State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv.
Rep. 6 (Utah 1989); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah
1988); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah 1986).
Here, an evidentiary hearing was held which presented
in detail the evidence of prior bad acts the State wished to
admit.

The hearing took place during the State's case in chief

but at the conclusion of the presentation of the other evidence
the State presented.

The trial court had, therefore, a full

factual basis as to the acts themselves and their probative value
in regards to proof of defendant's intent while in the building
after hours.

In considering their admission, the court applied

the proper legal standard.

As such, this Court should generally

defer to the trial court's ruling.
However, the State recognizes that a close question of
admissibility is presented in this case.

Should this Court

consider the trial court to have erred in admitting the prior bad
acts, a determination must still be made as to whether the error
is harmless.

In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656, the Utah

Supreme Court, despite the State's position that the erroneous

admission was prejudicial, found that any error was harmless
where there was sufficient properly admitted evidence to convict
defendant.

Accord, State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966; State v.

Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1988)-

Other courts have

viewed cautionary instructions, as given here, as curative of any
prejudice.

United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.

1984).
Additionally, assuming arguendo that the trial court
committed error in admitting the evidence, the degree of harm
determined by this Court must be tempered by consideration of the
additional details of defendant's prior bad acts introduced by
defendant himself.

As stated numerous times, a defendant cannot

invite or compound error and then complain on appeal. State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116; State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26 (Utah 1989);
United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1973).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
conviction should be affirmed.
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